

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 09/16/2001

CRAIG MARQUIS (MARQUIS), [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] employed as [REDACTED]

System Operation Control, AMERICAN AIRLINES (AA), 4601 Highway 360, Fort Worth, Texas 76155, (817) 967-7100, was interviewed at his place of employment. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, MARQUIS provided the following information:

On September 11, 2001, at approximately 7:25 a.m. Central Standard Time, MARQUIS received a telephone call from the number 3 flight attendant on board Flight 11, identified by the crew manifest as B.A. ONG (ONG), AA employee number 131804. This telephone call was initially received by NIDIA GONZALES,

[REDACTED] an AA supervisor at the Raleigh Reservations Center in North Carolina. The call was transferred to central dispatch in Fort Worth, Texas, because there was a disturbance on board and the flight crew was not able to contact the cockpit. ONG wanted central dispatch to contact the cockpit. MARQUIS first confirmed that ONG was an AA flight attendant.

During this telephone call, ONG reported that there was a passenger on board who was armed with a knife. This passenger was seated in 10B and was identified as TOM ELSUQANI (phonetic). When MARQUIS first heard this, he thought that the knife might have been a Swiss army knife of some sort because it was not that uncommon for passengers to have these. ONG then informed MARQUIS that the passenger in seat 9B, DAVID LEWIN, had been fatally stabbed and that the number 1 flight attendant, K.A. MARTIN (MARTIN), AA employee number 307280, had been stabbed as well. MARTIN was in bad shape and was currently on oxygen. Besides these two individuals, the number 5 flight attendant, B. ARESTEGUI, AA employee number 167762, had been superficially wounded by the passenger with the knife.

In addition to these injuries, there were two men trying to gain access to the cockpit, and by this time, all passengers had been removed from first class. After the men gained access to the cockpit, ONG could hear loud arguing from the cockpit area. ONG also mentioned that there was something in the air that made it hard to breath. This

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Investigation on 09/11/2001 at Fort Worth, Texas

File # 265A-NY-280350-302

Date dictated 09/16/2001

by SA [REDACTED] AWG:awg; SSA [REDACTED]

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telephone conversation lasted from approximately 7:25 a.m. until approximately 7:49 a.m.

There was no doctor on board Flight 11 to help the injured; as a result, MARQUIS wanted the aircraft to land at the next available airport. Because of the medical emergencies and the violence, MARQUIS intended for medical personnel and law enforcement to meet the aircraft as soon as it landed. MARQUIS had the flight tagged as a confirmed hijacking and contacted air traffic control (ATC) regarding the situation. MARQUIS informed the [redacted] of what was happening with Flight 11 and instructed her to contact the crew immediately and to perform a range analysis given the amount of fuel on the aircraft. ATC reportedly heard arguing over the microphone, hearing a statement to the effect of "either turn back or we'll kill you." The pilot apparently keyed the microphone at some point during these events thereby allowing ATC to hear part of what was happening. It was thought that these transmissions were recorded by ATC, in this case Boston ATC. During the time in which the telephone conversation occurred, the aircraft flew erratically and was descending in altitude. The transponder was turned off, but ATC was handling this flight as a confirmed hijacking and was attempting to track it.

Soon after ONG hung up the telephone, MARQUIS received a call from [redacted] an AA [redacted] at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York, New York. [redacted] reported smoke coming from the World Trade Center and asked what was happening. Based upon his conversation with [redacted] MARQUIS figured the impact of Flight 11 was close to 7:49 a.m., corresponding to the end of the telephone call from ONG. [redacted] called again at approximately 8:10 a.m. and stated that the NEW YORK PORT AUTHORITY confirmed that both towers of the World Trade Center were on fire and that an AA aircraft was involved.

Although unsure, MARQUIS thought that his telephone conversation with ONG was recorded. He would ascertain whether the conversation was recorded and would notify the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION regarding this. The number 9 flight attendant, M. SWEENEY, AA employee number 129043, telephoned the AA Flight Services Department in Boston, Massachusetts.

Regarding the hijacking of Flight 77, the aircraft had crashed before AA really knew that anything was happening on board. AA was concentrating on Flight 11 and did not realize the peril on Flight 77 until it was too late.

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MARQUIS provided a copy of his notes and a crew manifest for Flight 11, with notes on the manifest. See FD-340 envelope for these documents.

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